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Immunity for Vaccine Manufacturers: The 
Vaccine Act and Preemption of Design Defect 
Claims 
Eva B. Stensvad∗ 
Stefan Ferrari was a normal toddler until the day he sud-
denly stopped talking.1 The now eleven-year-old autistic boy’s 
parents blame the booster shots he received when he was eight-
een months old.2 Hannah Bruesewitz was a healthy infant until 
she developed a seizure disorder following her third diphtheria-
tetanus-pertussis (DTP) vaccine when she was six months old.3 
She is now an eighteen-year-old with a residual seizure disor-
der and developmental delay who will require special medical 
care for the rest of her life.4 In Stefan’s case, the Georgia Su-
preme Court ruled that the National Childhood Vaccine Injury 
Act (Vaccine Act) does not preempt all design defect claims if a 
safer alternative vaccine was known.5 In Pennsylvania, where 
Hannah resides, the Third Circuit interpreted the Vaccine Act 
to bar all such claims against vaccine manufacturers.6 In other 
words, Stefan is allowed to sue the vaccine manufacturer for 
his injuries; Hannah is not. 
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2011, University of Minnesota Law School; M.D. 2007, 
Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine; B.A. 2003, Northwest-
ern University. I would like to thank Professor Ralph Hall, Anna Hickman, 
and Joe Hansen for their invaluable guidance and comments, as well as Scott 
Jahnke and the Editors and Staff of the Minnesota Law Review for their hard 
work in editing this Note. Finally, my greatest thanks to my husband, Karl, 
and son, Andrew, for their endless support, patience, encouragement, and 
love. Copyright © 2010 by Eva B. Stensvad. 
 1. Bill Rankin, Allow Vaccine Suit, Parents Ask Justices, ATLANTA J.-
CONST., May 21, 2008, at B1, available at http://www.ajc.com/metro/content/ 
metro/stories/2008/05/21/vaccine.html?cxntlid=inform_artr. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 236 (3d Cir. 2009), cert. 
granted, 130 S. Ct. 1734 (2010). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d 236, 237–38 (Ga. 2008). 
 6. Bruesewitz, 561 F.3d at 255. 
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Vaccines are one of medicine’s greatest accomplishments.7 
They prevent many potentially lethal and debilitating diseas-
es.8 Even today, as fears of new influenza pandemics abound, 
there is a desperate rush to access vaccines to ward off these 
unknown dangers.9 
 Despite all the benefits vaccines afford, they also carry 
some risk of side effects, many of which are either unknown or 
unpredictable.10 Currently, there are over 5000 cases in Vac-
cine Court11 in which families allege that vaccines containing 
thimerosal, a mercury derivative, caused their children to de-
velop autism.12 Increased vaccine litigation could potentially 
discourage manufacturers from remaining in the vaccine mar-
ket, thus threatening the vaccine supply and the public 
health.13  
The risk of vaccine shortages is a real possibility. Between 
2001 and 2002 there were nationwide shortages of eight of the 
eleven recommended childhood vaccines.14 Only four manufac-
turers produce nearly all of the pediatric vaccines available in 
 
 7. See CDC, Ten Great Public Health Achievements—United States, 
1900–1999, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 241, 241 (1999) (listing 
vaccination at the top of the list of the ten great public health achievements). 
 8. CDC, Impact of Vaccines Universally Recommended for Children—United 
States, 1900–1998, 48 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 243, 245 (1999).  
 9. See Maura Lerner, Flu Vaccine Shortage Shutters Walk-In Clinics, For 
Now, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis, Minn.), Sept. 23, 2009, http://www.startribune 
.com/lifestyle/health/60339972.html (describing flu-shot clinic cancellations due 
to shortages). 
 10. See Possible Side-Effects From Vaccines, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/ 
vaccines/vac-gen/side-effects.htm (last modified June 3, 2010) (discussing the 
many possible side effects from various vaccines). 
 11. The Vaccine Act created a special court within the U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims, presided over by Special Masters that adjudicates all vaccine claims 
processed pursuant to the requirements of the Vaccine Act. See Vaccine Pro-
gram/Office of Special Masters, U.S. CT. FED. CLAIMS, http://www.uscfc 
.uscourts.gov/vaccine-programoffice-special-masters (last visited Oct. 16, 2010). 
 12. See About the Omnibus Autism Proceeding, HEALTH RESOURCES & 
SERVICES ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/omnibusproceeding 
.htm (last updated Aug. 19, 2010) (explaining that as of August 2010, there 
were over 5000 cases involving claims of vaccine-related autism awaiting ad-
judication). 
 13. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6344, 6345 (explaining that due to an increase in vaccine litigation, the price 
of vaccines increased, the number of vaccine manufacturers decreased, and the 
level of immunization decreased). 
 14. Losing Momentum: Are Childhood Vaccine Supplies Adequate?: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Pub. Health of the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., 
Labor, and Pensions, 107th Cong. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Losing Momentum] 
(statement of Sen. Jack Reed). 
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the United States.15 Five such vaccines are produced by only 
one manufacturer.16 The loss of any manufacturer from the 
market has the potential to cripple the vaccine supply. In 2004, 
one British manufacturer encountered production difficulties, 
resulting in a loss of half of the United States’ supply of the flu 
vaccine.17 In 2009, there were national shortages of the season-
al flu vaccine as well as the novel H1N1 flu vaccine due to in-
creased demand on an already strained supply.18 The burden of 
litigation may overwhelm an already struggling production sys-
tem. 
At the heart of this issue is the Vaccine Act,19 which sought 
to address the issues of vaccine safety, compensation for vac-
cine-related injuries, and liability protection for vaccine manu-
facturers.20 The Act expressly prohibits litigation arising from 
“side effects that were unavoidable even though the vaccine 
was properly prepared and was accompanied by proper direc-
tions and warnings.”21 This language has been interpreted in 
two different ways. In Ferrari, the court found that the statute 
only preempts defective design litigation after it has been de-
termined, on a case-by-case basis, that the injury was, in fact, 
“unavoidable.”22 In Bruesewitz, the court held that the statute 
preempts all vaccine design defect claims.23 The Ferrari inter-
pretation may affect vaccine manufacturers’ continued partici-
pation in the market, and the Bruesewitz interpretation may 
affect public confidence in vaccination programs. The safety of 
vaccines, protection of public health, and security of the vaccine 
supply all depend on this critical distinction. 
 
 15. Id. at 2. 
 16. Id. at 4 (statement of Janet Heinrich, Director, Health Care—Public 
Health Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office). 
 17. Andrew Pollack, U.S. Will Miss Half Its Supply of Flu Vaccine, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2004, at A1. 
 18. See, e.g., Delthia Ricks, Seasonal Flu Vaccine Shortage Hits Long Is-
land, NEWSDAY, Oct. 16, 2009, at A8 (describing the suspension of flu clinics 
resulting from a shortage of the seasonal flu vaccine); Lerner, supra note 9 
(reporting that vaccine demand is overwhelming the supply as manufacturers 
try to produce two different flu vaccines). 
 19. National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-
10 to -34 (2006).  
 20. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 5–7 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6346–48. 
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22 (emphasis added). 
 22. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d 236, 242 (Ga. 2008). 
 23. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 255 (3d Cir. 2009), cert. 
granted, 130 S. Ct. 1734 (2010). 
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This Note argues that both the Bruesewitz and Ferrari 
courts got it wrong. The text of the Vaccine Act requires some 
case-by-case analysis to determine whether a particular vaccine 
is unavoidably unsafe. Congress, however, has already con-
ducted these analyses with respect to the federally encouraged 
pediatric vaccines. Therefore, the Vaccine Act preempts design 
defect claims with respect to these particular vaccines. Part I 
provides an overview of the role and regulation of vaccines, in-
troduces the text and history of the Vaccine Act, and discusses 
the current controversy involving vaccine-related injuries and 
recent preemption jurisprudence. Part II critiques the argu-
ments in favor of and against preemption, closely examining 
the plain text of the Vaccine Act and analyzing Congress’s role 
in creating and regulating national vaccine policy. Part III ar-
gues that although the Act requires an analysis to determine 
whether a particular vaccine’s benefits justify its risks, Con-
gress is in a better position than judges or juries to conduct 
these inquiries. As the nation faces threats of global pandemics 
and vaccine shortages, it is essential that the Vaccine Act is in-
terpreted to ensure the continued production, development, and 
safety of lifesaving vaccines, while adequately protecting those 
who are harmed as a result of such products.  
I.  VACCINE REGULATION, LEGISLATION, AND 
PREEMPTION   
Vaccination is one of the greatest public health achieve-
ments in the United States.24 It has greatly reduced the mor-
bidity of diseases that once devastated the population, such as 
smallpox, measles, poliomyelitis, diphtheria, and pertussis.25 
Every state, and the District of Columbia, recognizes that vac-
cines are critical to maintain public health, and has instituted 
mandatory immunization requirements for children.26 Despite 
the many benefits vaccines confer upon society, they also occa-
sionally injure those whom they are supposed to protect.27 This 
has led to rising fears of vaccines and some resistance to vac-
 
 24. CDC, supra note 7, at 241. 
 25. CDC, supra note 8, at 245 tbl.2. Some diseases have nearly, if not 
completely, been eradicated through vaccination programs. See id.  
 26. CDC, CHILDCARE AND SCHOOL VACCINATION REQUIREMENTS: 2007–
2008, at 4, available at http://www2a.cdc.gov/nip/schoolsurv/combinedlaws2007 
.pdf (last visited Oct. 10, 2010). 
 27. Vaccine Safety and Adverse Events, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/ 
vac-gen/safety/default.htm (last modified Nov. 19, 2009) (explaining that all 
vaccines carry some risk). 
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cination programs.28 Predictably, this has also led to civil litiga-
tion against vaccine manufacturers.29 
This Part provides a brief overview of the role of the feder-
al government in vaccine regulation and sets forth the contents 
and history of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 
1986.30 This Part then introduces the current issues surround-
ing vaccination, including the two recent court decisions which 
have brought to the forefront the question of whether the Vac-
cine Act preempts certain civil claims against vaccine manufac-
turers.31 
A. FEDERAL REGULATION OF VACCINES 
The federal government has a long history of involvement 
in the effort to prevent childhood disease and regulate vaccine 
development and production, beginning with the Virus Serums 
and Toxins Act of 1902.32 Since then, it has taken an increas-
ingly active role in promoting vaccine development and admin-
istration through numerous legislative acts, federal grants, and 
nationwide immunization initiatives.33 The National Vaccine 
Program Office (NVPO), within the United States Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS), is responsible for coor-
dinating the activities of the many federal agencies involved in 
immunization efforts, including the Centers for Disease Control 
(CDC), Agency for International Development (USAID), Cen-
ters for Medicare and Medicaid Service (CMS), Health Re-
sources and Services Administration (HRSA), National Insti-
tutes of Health (NIH), and the Food and Drug Administration 
 
 28. See, e.g., Alice Park, How Safe Are Vaccines?, TIME, June 2, 2008, at 
36, 38 (explaining that “increasing numbers of parents are raising questions 
about whether vaccines . . . are actually harmful to children”). 
 29. See About the Omnibus Autism Proceeding, supra note 12 (noting that 
there are more than 5000 vaccine-related autism cases currently awaiting ad-
judication). 
 30. National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 
to -34 (2006). 
 31. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 
S. Ct. 1734 (2010); Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d 236 (Ga. 2008). 
 32. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH & THE ENV’T OF THE H. COMM. ON 
ENERGY & COMMERCE, 99TH CONG., CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS 44 (Comm. 
Print 1986) [hereinafter CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS]; see also INST. OF MED., 
VACCINE SUPPLY AND INNOVATION 16–17 (1985) (describing the history of fed-
eral vaccine regulation and legislation). 
 33. See CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra note 32, at 44–49 (describing 
congressional efforts to increase immunization levels throughout the nation).  
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(FDA), among others.34 The CDC contracts for vaccine prices35 
and the federal government purchases over fifty percent of the 
childhood vaccines administered in the United States each 
year.36 Federal encouragement of state vaccination programs 
has been highly successful, as all fifty states and the District of 
Columbia have enacted laws requiring childhood immuniza-
tions.37  
The two main programs through which the federal gov-
ernment directs vaccine policy are the Vaccines for Children 
(VFC) program, which provides free vaccines to children in 
need,38 and the Section 317 Immunization Grant Program,39 
which provides grants to all fifty states, the District of Colum-
bia, and other urban areas and territories, to provide vaccines 
to those not served by the VFC program.40 The federal Advisory 
Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), representing 
eight different federal agencies and twenty-six nongovernment 
agencies,41 examines in detail the risks, benefits, costs, and 
public health need for each childhood vaccine.42 The ACIP 
draws upon a variety of sources of information, including “pub-
 
 34. National Vaccine Program Office, U.S. DEPARMENTT HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov/nvpo/about.html (last modified Sept. 27, 2006). 
The NVPO works to fulfill the goals of the National Vaccine Plan, which “pro-
vides a framework, including goals, objectives, and strategies, for pursuing the 
prevention of infectious diseases through immunizations.” Id. 
 35. See CDC Vaccine Price List, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/programs/ 
vfc/cdc-vac-price-list.htm (last updated Oct. 6, 2010) (listing current vaccine 
contract prices). 
 36. Losing Momentum, supra note 14, at 4 (statement of Janet Heinrich, 
Director, Health Care—Public Health Issues, U.S. General Accounting Office). 
 37. CDC, supra note 26, at 4. 
 38. Vaccines for Children Program (VFC), CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/ 
vaccines/programs/vfc/default.htm (last modified Oct. 7, 2010). 
 39. See Public Health Act, Pub. L. No. 87-868, § 317, 76 Stat. 1155, 1155–
56 (1962) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 247b (2006)); Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention: Section 317 Immunization Program, U.S. DEPARTMENT 
HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov/recovery/reports/plans/section 
317imunization_cdc.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2010) (describing recent appro-
priations to the Section 317 Immunization Program). 
 40. See CDC, IMMUNIZATION GRANT PROGRAM (SECTION 317) (2007), avail-
able at http://www.cdc.gov/NCIRD/progbriefs/downloads/grant-317.pdf. A ma-
jority of the grants allocated under section 317 are for routine childhood vac-
cines. Id. 
 41. See Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), CDC, http:// 
www.cdc.gov/vaccines/recs/acip/default.htm (last modified Oct. 14, 2010). 
 42. See CDC, General Recommendations on Immunization, 55 MORBIDITY 
& MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1, 1–2 (2006) (discussing the process by which the 
ACIP makes vaccine recommendations). 
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lished and unpublished studies . . . and expert opinion[s] of 
public health officials and specialists in clinical and preventive 
medicine,” in order to generate a list of recommended vaccines 
for children.43 The Secretary of HHS then uses these recom-
mendations in selecting vaccines for the various federal vaccine 
programs.44  
The Center for Biologics Evaluation and Research (CBER) 
within the FDA has primary responsibility for ensuring vaccine 
safety.45 The FDA regulates vaccines as “biological products” 
pursuant to the Public Health Service Act (PHSA).46 There are 
stringent regulations encompassing every aspect of vaccination, 
including licensing,47 testing,48 manufacturing,49 and post-
market reporting.50 The Secretary of HHS has the authority to 
suspend or revoke licenses,51 and there are numerous provi-
sions regarding post-market surveillance and risk evaluation.52 
The FDA’s comprehensive and “rigorous” review of vaccines 
plays a crucial role in assuring the safety and efficacy of child-
hood vaccines.53  
The federal government is extensively involved in immuni-
zation in the United States. It plays a role in vaccine develop-
ment, marketing, licensing, distribution, and regulation. 
Through its many agencies, vaccination programs, and advisory 
committees, it is a major force in shaping national vaccine poli-
cy. 
 
 43. Id. at 1. 
 44. See ACIP Charter, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/recs/ACIP/charter 
.htm (last updated Apr. 6, 2010) (describing ACIP’s provision of advice and 
guidance to the HHS, the CDC, and the states for the implementation of vac-
cination programs). 
 45. See Vaccines, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/Vaccines/ 
default.htm (last updated Mar. 29, 2010). 
 46. 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2006). 
 47. 21 C.F.R. §§ 601.1–.29 (2010). 
 48. Id. § 601.25. 
 49. Id. §§ 600.10–.15. 
 50. Id. §§ 600.80, 601.70. For a detailed description of FDA regulation of 
vaccines, see Linda A. Willett, Note, DPT Vaccine-Related Injury Actions: Fed-
eral Preemption Reconsidered, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 373 (1988) and Katherine 
Davenport, Vaccines and the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program 
(Apr. 10, 2000) (unpublished student paper, Harvard Law School), available 
at http://leda.law.harvard.edu/leda/search/toc.php3?handle=HLS.Library.Leda/ 
davenportk-vaccines_national_vaccine. 
 51. 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(2)(A) (2006). 
 52. See, e.g., id. § 262(a)(2)(D), (d), (j). 
 53. See Vaccines, supra note 45. 
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B. VACCINE ACT LITIGATION 
Despite all the safety mechanisms in place, injuries from 
vaccines still occur. These injuries sometimes give rise to litiga-
tion, which in turn prompts a flurry of legislative action. Such 
was the case when the Vaccine Act was enacted. In the early 
1980s, a series of problems emerged that threatened the na-
tion’s immunization efforts. As immunization programs gained 
popularity and more children received vaccinations, there was 
also a concurrent increase in public awareness of vaccine-
related injuries.54 Those suffering from such injuries sought re-
compense through civil litigation, but the system was time-
consuming, expensive, and often inadequate.55 Rising litigation 
against vaccine manufacturers also resulted in difficulties pro-
curing affordable product liability insurance, increased vaccine 
prices, and fewer vaccine manufacturers in the market.56 By 
1986, there was only one manufacturer of the polio vaccine, one 
manufacturer of the measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine, and 
two manufacturers of the DTP vaccine.57 The “unstable and 
unpredictable childhood vaccine market [made] the threat of 
vaccine shortages a real possibility” and undermined the na-
tional goal of increasing the “availability and use of vaccines to 
prevent childhood diseases.”58 The country was dangerously 
close to vaccine shortages and a possible “resurgence of pre-
ventable diseases.”59 
Congress sought a solution that would address both the in-
adequate approach to compensating those injured by recom-
mended vaccines and the instability and unpredictability of the 
childhood vaccine market that threatened the nation’s vaccine 
supply.60 That solution was the Vaccine Act.61 Part A of the Act 
 
 54. See CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra note 32, at 21. 
 55. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 6 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6344, 6347. 
 56. See id. at 4, 6. The price of one vaccine reportedly increased by as much 
as 2000 percent in only two years. CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra note 32, 
at 60. 
 57. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 7.  
 58. Id. at 5.  
 59. Id. at 7. Describing the threat of a nationwide vaccine shortage, one 
article states: “If there were [a] . . . clock marking the time remaining until 
vaccines become either unavailable or unacceptable . . . it would stand peri-
lously close to midnight in the United States.” Wendy K. Mariner & Mary E. 
Clark, Confronting the Immunization Problem: Proposals for Compensation 
Reform, 76 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 703, 703 (1986), available at http://www.ncbi 
.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1646786/pdf/amjph00269-0097.pdf. 
 60. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 7. 
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created a no-fault compensation program to ensure faster and 
easier recovery for those injured by vaccines.62 It also estab-
lished a Vaccine Court to hear these claims,63 in which injured 
parties are not required to prove causation or negligence64 if 
their injuries are consistent with the Vaccine Injury Table 
created by the Act.65 Congress hoped this program would pro-
vide better compensation for injured parties, while simulta-
neously diverting claims away from litigation against vaccine 
manufacturers.66 Part B of the Act deals with the remedies 
available to an injured party should he or she reject the judg-
ment of the Vaccine Court.67 Finally, Part C provides for vari-
ous mechanisms to ensure vaccine safety, including a recording 
and reporting system68 and a mandate for safer childhood vac-
cines.69  
Under Part B, if an individual rejects the judgment of the 
Vaccine Court, he or she may pursue traditional litigation 
against the vaccine manufacturer according to state law, except 
as provided in various parts of section 22 of the Act.70 Section 
22(b)(1) states that a vaccine manufacturer shall not be liable 
for a “vaccine-related injury or death . . . [that] resulted from 
side effects that were unavoidable” if “the vaccine was properly 
prepared and was accompanied by proper directions and warn-
ings.”71 This language was adopted from comment k of section 
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which carves out an 
exception to strict liability of product manufacturers for prod-
ucts that are “unavoidably unsafe.”72 Under comment k, “ap-
 
 61. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 to -34 (2006). 
 62. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 3. 
 63. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12 (1986). 
 64. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 12. 
 65. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14 (2006). The Vaccine Injury Table contains known 
adverse events associated with particular vaccines and provides the basis for 
compensation if an individual suffers from one of the included events during 
the required time period. See id. For a detailed discussion of the compensation 
program procedure, see Victor E. Schwartz, National Childhood Vaccine In-
jury Act of 1986: An Ad Hoc Remedy or a Window for the Future?, 48 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 387, 389–92 (1987). 
 66. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 12–13. 
 67. Id. at 3. 
 68. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-25. 
 69. See id. § 300aa-27. 
 70. See id. § 300aa-22. Sections 22(b), (c) and (e) are the provisions that 
may affect state law. See id. 
 71. Id. § 300aa-22(b)(1). 
 72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965). 
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parently useful and desirable product[s]” which have a known 
risk and are “quite incapable of being made safe for their in-
tended and ordinary use” are considered “unavoidably un-
safe.”73 If “[s]uch a product [is] properly prepared, and accom-
panied by proper directions and warning, [then it] is not 
defective,” and the product’s manufacturer is not held strictly 
liable.74 
This section of the Vaccine Act has created enormous con-
troversy. It shields manufacturers from some types of design 
defect liability,75 but the limits of this preemption clause are 
not clearly defined. Because federal laws are “the supreme Law 
of the Land,”76 and any “state laws that conflict with federal 
law are ‘without effect,’”77 it is important to define the precise 
scope of this preemptive language. Courts generally agree that 
the clause encompasses design defect claims based in both 
strict liability and negligence.78 They do not agree, however, as 
to whether all vaccines are, by definition, “unavoidably unsafe,” 
or instead, whether a vaccine can only be classified as “un-
avoidably unsafe” after a case-by-case analysis of the specifical-
ly challenged design element of the vaccine and its allegedly 
causal connection to a particular injury.79 Even if a case-by-
case assessment is required for each vaccine, it is not clear from 
the text who is supposed to make that determination—
Congress, administrative agencies, or courts? 
Two cases recently analyzed the express preemption clause 
in section 22(b)(1) of the Vaccine Act. In American Home Prod-
ucts Corp. v. Ferrari, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the 
Vaccine Act does not preempt all design defect claims against 
 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. Comment k points to the rabies vaccine as “[a]n outstanding ex-
ample” of an “[u]navoidably unsafe product.” Id. 
 75. The three categories of defective products which give rise to liability 
are manufacturing defects (“when the product departs from its intended de-
sign”), defective design (when the design itself carries unreasonable risks of 
harm), and defect due to inadequate instructions or warnings. RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998). 
 76. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2. 
 77. Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 129 S. Ct. 538, 543 (2008) (quoting Maryland 
v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)). 
 78. See, e.g., Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 248 (3d Cir. 2009), 
cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1734 (2010); Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 668 
S.E.2d 236, 242 (Ga. 2008). 
 79. See, e.g., Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 835–36 
(Neb. 2000) (noting that courts have disagreed as to comment k’s application). 
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vaccine manufacturers.80 The parents of an autistic boy 
brought claims under strict liability and negligence, alleging 
that the manufacturers could have designed a safer children’s 
vaccine.81 The Ferrari court relied heavily upon the conditional 
language of the statute,82 the desire to give meaning to the 
word “unavoidable,”83 and subsequent legislative history stat-
ing that the Vaccine Act was not meant to “decide as a matter 
of law whether vaccines were unavoidably unsafe or not,” but 
that “[t]his question is left to the courts.”84 Ultimately, the 
court found no “‘clear and manifest’ congressional purpose to 
supplant state tort law,”85 and therefore concluded that section 
22(b)(1) only preempted liability for defective designs “if it is 
determined, on a case-by-case basis, that the particular vaccine 
was unavoidably unsafe.”86 
In Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc.,87 the Third Circuit rejected the 
Ferrari court’s reasoning and held that the Vaccine Act ex-
pressly preempted design defect claims.88 The Bruesewitz court 
did not consider the presence of the word “unavoidable” to be 
dispositive, explaining that “it is always possible to construct 
through hindsight . . . alternate wording that would render it 
more clear.”89 The court rejected the legislative history upon 
which the Ferrari court relied, finding it to be unreliable subse-
quent history that said little about the intent of the earlier 
Congress that enacted the Vaccine Act.90 Instead, the court 
reasoned that if a case-by-case analysis was needed for each 
vaccine to determine whether the side effects were unavoidable, 
then the preemption clause would effectively preempt nothing 
at all, since all claims would be subject to some judicial evalua-
tion.91 Therefore, it found a “clear and manifest” expression of 
congressional intent to bar all design defect claims, without any 
 
 80. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d at 242. 
 81. Id. at 237. 
 82. See id. at 240 (“The conditional nature of this clause contemplates the 
occurrence of side effects which are avoidable, and for which a vaccine manu-
facturer may be civilly liable.”). 
 83. See id. at 240 (refusing to read out words from a statute). 
 84. Id. at 241 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 100-391(I), at 691 (1987), reprinted 
in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-364, 2313-365). 
 85. Id. at 242. 
 86. Id.  
 87. 561 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1734 (2010). 
 88. Id. at 255. 
 89. Id. at 246. 
 90. See id. at 250. 
 91. See id. at 246. 
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“unavoidability” analysis. It concluded that at the very least, 
Congress intended to preclude design defect claims concerning 
the DTP vaccine at issue, since it was the design of the DTP 
vaccine and the resulting litigation which spawned the Vaccine 
Act.92 
In reaching their conclusions, both courts referred to a 
“presumption against preemption.”93 The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly stated that there is a presumption against federal 
preemption, especially in areas traditionally regulated by the 
states.94 When faced with equally plausible readings, the Court 
opts to accept the reading disfavoring preemption,95 because it 
assumes that the “historic police powers of the States [are] not 
to be superseded . . . unless that [is] the clear and manifest 
purpose of Congress.”96 Recently, the Court applied this pre-
sumption in holding that failure-to-warn claims against manu-
facturers of pharmaceuticals are not impliedly preempted by 
FDA approvals pursuant to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act.97 The Court has also used this presumption to find that the 
Medical Device Amendments do not expressly preempt negli-
gent design claims regarding a product that has not been sub-
jected to the FDA’s “rigorous” pre-market approval process.98 
The Ferrari and Bruesewitz courts, however, did not find it nec-
essary to rely upon this doctrine, since both found a “clear and 
manifest” expression of congressional intent, albeit coming to 
opposite conclusions.99 
 
 92. Id. at 250–51. 
 93. Id. at 240; Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d 236, 238–39 
(Ga. 2008). 
 94. See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005). 
 95. See id. 
 96. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
 97. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1191 (2009). 
 98. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 477, 485 (1996). 
 99. There is some debate as to whether the presumption against preemp-
tion applies at all when dealing with an express preemption clause rather than 
an issue of implied preemption. See Bates, 544 U.S. at 457 (Thomas, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (explaining that the “presumption does not 
apply . . . when Congress has included within a statute an express pre-emption 
provision”); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 291–92 (2000) (ar-
guing that the presumption against preemption makes little sense when used 
to interpret an express preemption clause); Michael X. Imbroscio, Federal 
Preemption in the Non-Drug Context After Wyeth v. Levine 15 (June 2009) (un-
published manuscript), available at http://www.cov.com/mimbroscio/ (arguing 
that an “unrestrained ‘presumption against preemption’” doctrine could “emas-
culate” an otherwise appropriate express preemption clause). 
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Thus, as it currently stands, individuals injured by vac-
cines in Georgia may sue vaccine manufacturers under any 
theory of liability, but individuals similarly injured in Pennsyl-
vania cannot. This inconsistency has drawn the attention of the 
U.S. Supreme Court, which recently granted a writ of certiorari 
in Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc.100 The Supreme Court is now 
poised to rule on the preemptive scope of the Vaccine Act. 
C. VACCINATION CONTROVERSY TODAY 
The issues that confronted the nation in 1986—such as 
threats of vaccine shortages and demand for vaccines that ex-
ceeds the supply—are still in effect today.101 The loss of even 
one vaccine manufacturer has the potential to cripple the na-
tion’s vaccination programs.102 Meanwhile, an increasing num-
ber of parents are questioning the safety and necessity of child-
hood vaccines.103 They have become particularly concerned with 
vaccines containing thimerosal, a mercury-containing com-
pound that has been used as a preservative in vaccines since 
the 1930s.104 Although preservatives are required to prevent 
contamination in multi-dose vials of vaccines,105 a growing 
number of parents suspect thimerosal is a cause of their chil-
dren’s autism.106 As of August 2010, over 5600 cases alleging a 
causal relationship between vaccinations and autism have been 
filed in the Vaccine Court.107 So far, these claimants have not 
fared well.108 If this trend continues, it is likely that they will 
 
 100. 130 S. Ct. 1734 (2010). 
 101. See, e.g., Lerner, supra note 9 (describing influenza vaccine shortages). 
 102. See Pollack, supra note 17, at A1 (discussing vaccine shortages result-
ing from the temporary suspension of one British manufacturer). 
 103. Park, supra note 28, at 38. 
 104. Thimerosal in Vaccines, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/biologicsbloodvaccines/ 
safetyavailability/vaccinesafety/ucm096228 (last updated Mar. 31, 2010). 
 105. See 21 C.F.R. § 610.15(a) (2010) (“Products in multiple-dose containers 
shall contain a preservative . . . .”).  
 106. Autism, or Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASDs), are developmental 
disabilities that cause communication, social, and behavioral challenges. Au-
tism Spectrum Disorders (ASDs): What Should You Know?, CDC, http://www.cdc 
.gov/ncbddd/autism/index.html (last updated June 24, 2009). Approximately 
one in 110 children in the U.S. have an ASD. Id. 
 107. About the Omnibus Autism Proceeding, supra note 12. 
 108. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Statement from 
the Department of Health and Human Services Regarding the Decisions of the 
U.S. Court of Federal Claims in the Omnibus Autism Proceeding (Feb. 12, 
2009), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2009pres/02/20090212a.html 
(explaining that after careful review, the Special Masters in the Vaccine Court 
have found no association between vaccines and autism). 
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next try to bring their injury claims to court.109 An influx of 
thousands of product liability claims has an even greater poten-
tial to permanently shut down the vaccine supply than the liti-
gation that led to the passage of the Vaccine Act in 1986. If 
these claims are preempted by the Vaccine Act, injured parties 
will only be able to recover for design-related claims in the Vac-
cine Court, and vaccine manufacturers will have the security 
they need to remain in the vaccine market. If these claims are 
not preempted, injured parties will have the ability to pursue 
recompense in any available venue, but manufacturers may 
fear their increased exposure to liability and abandon vaccine 
production in favor of more lucrative endeavors. 
II.  ARE ROUTINE CHILDHOOD VACCINES 
“UNAVOIDABLY UNSAFE” PRODUCTS?   
The Vaccine Act’s express preemption clause110 exempts 
vaccine manufacturers from liability for injuries that “resulted 
from side effects that were unavoidable even though the vaccine 
was properly prepared and was accompanied by proper direc-
tions and warnings.”111 In determining the scope of that lan-
guage, courts have had difficulty defining the word “unavoida-
ble.” One possibility is that vaccine injuries are, by definition, 
“unavoidable” whenever the vaccine is properly prepared and 
accompanied by proper directions and warnings.112 This read-
ing “essentially equate[s] FDA approval with a determination 
that side effects are ‘unavoidable.’”113 Another interpretation 
requires a preliminary case-by-case determination that the in-
juries could not have reasonably been avoided before those in-
 
 109. See, e.g., Mary Holland, Help Preserve the Right to Bring Vaccine In-
jury Claims to Civil Court, AGE AUTISM (Aug. 26, 2009), http://www 
.ageofautism.com/2009/08/help-preserve-the-right-to-bring-vaccine-injury-claims 
-to-civil-court.html. 
 110. See Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 242 (3d Cir. 2009) (con-
cluding that section 22(b)(1) of the Vaccine Act contains an express preemp-
tion clause), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1734 (2010). 
 111. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 112. See Blackmon v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 328 F. Supp. 2d 659, 664 
(S.D. Tex. 2004) (explaining that because “[t]he drafters of § 22(b) were obviously 
aware of the different heads of products liability,” and only identified two of 
these as determinative of unavoidability, “[i]f the alleged defect . . . does not 
fall into one of these two enumerated categories, the defect is considered ‘un-
avoidable’”).  
 113. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d 236, 237 (Ga. 2008) (quot-
ing Ferrari v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 650 S.E.2d 585, 588 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)). 
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juries are characterized as “unavoidable” for the purpose of 
preemption.114  
This Part demonstrates that although the statute is facial-
ly ambiguous, examination of comment k115 reveals that some 
risk-benefit analysis is necessary before a vaccine’s side effects 
and injuries are characterized as “unavoidable.” The contents of 
the statute, along with Congress’s past and current behavior, 
demonstrate that Congress is the body responsible for conduct-
ing these analyses. This Part shows that Congress has already 
assumed this role as decisionmaker, and furthermore, that the 
Congress-as-decisionmaker interpretation of section 22(b)(1) is 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence. 
A. SECTION 22(B)(1) REQUIRES CASE-BY-CASE 
DETERMINATIONS OF UNAVOIDABILITY 
The plain text of the statute does not clearly indicate its 
preemptive scope.116 If the statute preempts all claims for inju-
ries arising where there is no manufacturing defect or failure to 
warn, then the word “unavoidable” is meaningless.117 The stat-
ute could have simply eliminated the words “that were un-
avoidable” and retained the same meaning.118 Yet giving full 
effect to the word “unavoidable” would make the entire clause 
pointless, because all side effects from vaccines are theoretical-
ly avoidable—a person can simply opt not to get vaccinated. 
An examination of comment k of section 402A of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, from which this language was bor-
rowed,119 sheds some light on this matter. Comment k creates 
 
 114. See id. 
 115. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965). 
 116. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993) (ex-
plaining that the first step of statutory construction of an express preemption 
clause is to “focus on the plain wording”).  
 117. Courts strive to give meaning to every word in a statute, and would 
disfavor such a reading. See Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d at 240 (refusing to read out 
words from the statute); HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE 
CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS 83 (2008). 
 118. On the other hand, Congress could easily have drafted the statute to 
explicitly preserve design defect claims, just as it did with manufacturing and 
failure to warn claims. Section 22(b) could have read: “even though the vaccine 
was properly designed, properly prepared, and was accompanied by proper di-
rections and warnings.” Either way, this statute is “inartfully drafted.” Nitin 
Shah, Note, When Injury Is Unavoidable: The Vaccine Act’s Limited Preemp-
tion of Design Defect Claims, 96 VA. L. REV. 199, 203, 219 (2010). 
 119. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 25–26 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6344, 6366–67. 
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an exception from strict liability design defect claims120 for 
“[u]navoidably unsafe products.”121 These are “products which, 
in the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of 
being made safe for their intended and ordinary use,” yet are 
“apparently useful and desirable.”122 The comment sets forth 
the rabies vaccine as an example of such a product, because al-
though the vaccine can cause serious injuries, rabies itself is 
fatal, and so “the use of the vaccine [is] fully justified.”123 The 
comment, however, does not state that all vaccines are “un-
avoidably unsafe,” but rather “many other . . . vaccines” may 
qualify for this exception.124 States that have adopted comment 
k have interpreted it differently,125 but most require a case-by-
case analysis of the risks and benefits of the specific product at 
issue.126 Although there was no general agreement on the 
meaning of comment k in 1986 when the Vaccine Act was 
enacted,127 the language of the comment itself seems fairly 
straightforward. The comment conducts a risk-benefit analysis 
of the rabies vaccine, and in referring to “an apparently useful 
and desirable product,” it is clear that some entity must make 
this determination.128 In fact, one court acknowledged that it 
was “expanding the literal interpretation of comment k” by 
creating a per se rule that all FDA-approved prescription medi-
cations are “unavoidably unsafe.”129  
 
 120. Victor E. Schwartz, Unavoidably Unsafe Products: Clarifying the 
Meaning and Policy Behind Comment K, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1139, 1146 
(1985) (“[C]omment k deals with liability for design of . . . products.”). 
 121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965).  
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 835 (Neb. 
2000) (explaining that comment k “has been interpreted in a variety of ways in 
other jurisdictions”). 
 126. See Bryant v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 723, 726 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2003) (“Most of the states that have adopted Comment k have applied it 
in a more limited fashion and on a case-by-case basis.”); Toner v. Lederle 
Labs., 732 P.2d 297, 308 (Idaho 1987) (finding that the comment only applies 
“when the situation calls for it”). A minority of states do not require a case-by-
case determination for FDA-approved pharmaceuticals. See, e.g., Young v. Key 
Pharm., Inc., 922 P.2d 59, 64 (Wash. 1996) (“[A] separate determination of 
whether a product is unavoidably unsafe need not be made on a case-by-case 
basis if that product is a prescription drug.”). 
 127. See Militrano v. Lederle Labs., 769 N.Y.S.2d 839, 844–45 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 2003) (explaining that by 1986 courts had come to different conclusions as 
to whether a case-by-case determination was required for prescription drugs). 
 128. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965). 
 129. Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 1991). 
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The language of comment k and its adoption in the Vaccine 
Act suggests that some case-by-case analysis is required to de-
termine if a vaccine is “apparently useful and desirable,” de-
spite its inherent risks, so as to justify its use. However, the 
question remains as to whom this should be apparent. 
B. CONGRESS DECIDES WHETHER A VACCINE IS UNAVOIDABLY 
UNSAFE 
The Bruesewitz130 and Ferrari131 courts grappled with the 
question of whether section 22(b)(1) requires a case-by-case ex-
amination, but neither court considered who Congress intended 
to conduct this inquiry or whether it had already been per-
formed with respect to childhood vaccines.132 The text of the 
Vaccine Act does not clearly express who should make these 
case-by-case determinations, but the contents of the Act strong-
ly suggest that Congress intended to assume this decision-
making role. Although the legislative history of the Act is not 
clear on this point, Congress has demonstrated through action 
that it is the body responsible for making these decisions—it 
did so long before the Vaccine Act and has continued to do so 
since.  
1. The Structure and Contents of the Vaccine Act: Congress’s 
Role as Gatekeeper 
Despite the lack of any clear statement in the text indicat-
ing that Congress intended to assume the task of conducting 
risk-benefit analyses of childhood vaccines, the contents of the 
Vaccine Act itself show that Congress contemplated a large role 
for the federal government in making these determinations. 
The Act authorizes the Secretary of HHS to establish a “Na-
tional Vaccine Program to oversee and carry out Federal vac-
cine-related research, testing, licensing, production, and distri-
bution activities concerning all vaccines.”133 It created a 
National Vaccine Advisory Committee (NVAC) to make recom-
 
 130. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth Inc., 561 F.3d 233, 240 (3d Cir. 2009), cert. 
granted, 130 S. Ct. 1734 (2010). 
 131. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d 236, 242 (Ga. 2008). 
 132. “‘[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone’ in every pre-
emption case.” Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Re-
tail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)). 
 133. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6344, 6345; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -2 (2006). 
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mendations based on safety and efficacy.134 Subpart C of the 
Vaccine Act135 is replete with provisions providing for the re-
cording and reporting of adverse events,136 dissemination of 
vaccine information,137 and promotion of research and devel-
opment of safer childhood vaccines.138 Specifically, Congress 
delegated to the Secretary of HHS the responsibility of estab-
lishing a “task force on safer childhood vaccines” and “mak[ing] 
or assur[ing] improvements in . . . the licensing, manufactur-
ing, processing, testing, labeling, warning, . . . administration, 
. . . [and] surveillance” of vaccines “in order to reduce the risks 
of adverse reactions.”139 Furthermore, the Act provides for the 
involvement of multiple federal agencies in making such policy 
and safety assessments.140 
It is evident from these provisions that Congress sought to 
take over the leadership role in making vaccine-related deci-
sions. It delegated much of this responsibility to other agencies 
and decisionmaking bodies, but ultimately assumed the re-
sponsibility for nationwide policies regarding the safety and ef-
ficacy of various childhood vaccines.  
2. Legislative History of the Vaccine Act Is Unclear 
The “regulatory context,” which served as the “catalyst for 
passage” of the Act, can help illuminate Congress’s purpose.141 
Prior to 1986, courts decided on a case-by-case basis whether a 
vaccine was unavoidably unsafe142 and came to different con-
clusions.143 Vaccine manufacturers became concerned with 
 
 134. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-5 (2006). One of the functions of NVAC is to 
“[r]ecommend research priorities” to improve vaccine safety and efficacy. Na-
tional Vaccine Advisory Committee (NVAC), U.S. DEPARMENT OF HEALTH & 
HUM. SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov/nvpo/nvac/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2010). 
 135. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-25 to -28. 
 136. Id. § 300aa-25. 
 137. Id. § 300aa-26. 
 138. Id. § 300aa-27. 
 139. Id. 
 140. See, e.g., id. § 300aa-2(a)(7), (8) (mandating that the Director of the 
Vaccine Program coordinate with federal agencies and nongovernmental enti-
ties to monitor vaccine safety, efficacy, and demand). 
 141. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 519 (1992). 
 142. See, e.g., Johnson v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318, 1323 (Kan. 
1986) (finding the Sabin Polio vaccine “unavoidably unsafe”). 
 143. Compare Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1497 (D. Kan. 
1987) (refusing to find as a matter of law that the whole cell DTP vaccine is 
unavoidably unsafe), with White v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 533 N.E.2d 748, 754 
(Ohio 1988) (holding that the DTP vaccine containing whole cell pertussis is 
unavoidably unsafe). 
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their potential exposure to large damages awards and product 
liability insurers became hesitant to provide insurance cover-
age to these manufacturers.144 For these reasons, vaccine man-
ufacturers started to withdraw from the market, jeopardizing 
the supply of childhood vaccines.145 Through the Vaccine Act, 
Congress sought to provide more predictability with respect to 
manufacturers’ liability.146 There was also a competing purpose 
of the Vaccine Act—to ensure that those who suffered from vac-
cine-related injuries were able to secure adequate compensa-
tion.147 It is difficult to determine from these dueling legislative 
purposes whether Congress intended to foreclose design defect 
claims against manufacturers of childhood vaccines, since un-
der either interpretation, one legislative purpose is promoted at 
the expense of the other. 
The legislative history of the Vaccine Act does little to clar-
ify Congress’s intent.148 A House Report by the Committee on 
Energy and Commerce (1986 Report) made it clear that Con-
gress intended to make civil tort claims more difficult for plain-
tiffs, in exchange for providing them with “a comprehensive 
and fair compensation system” in the Vaccine Court.149 The 
concept of “unavoidably unsafe” “appl[ies] to the vaccines cov-
ered in the bill . . . [and] such products [are] not [to] be the sub-
ject of liability in the tort system.”150 Furthermore, unless there 
is a manufacturing defect or failure-to-warn claim, people in-
jured by vaccines covered by the Act “should pursue recom-
pense in the compensation system, not the tort system.”151 The 
1986 Report casts doubt on whether a court or jury could fairly 
decide these cases in which a blameless child is pitted against 
an impersonal manufacturer.152 Together, these statements in-
dicate that Congress intended to take these decisions away 
 
 144. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 6 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6344, 6347. 
 145. Id. at 6–7. 
 146. See id. at 7 (explaining that the Act was intended to give “manufac-
turers . . . a better sense of their potential litigation obligations”). 
 147. Id. at 6. 
 148. This is not uncommon, as “legislative history is itself often murky, 
ambiguous, and contradictory.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 
545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005). 
 149. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 25. 
 150. Id. at 26. 
 151. Id. 
 152. See id. 
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from trial courts and to make the risk-benefit decisions for the 
particular vaccines covered by the Act. 
The 1986 report, however, also states that “[v]accine in-
jured persons will now have an appealing alternative to the tort 
system,”153 which seems to indicate that Congress did not com-
pletely remove any particular cause of action from civil litiga-
tion. Furthermore, when enacting legislation to fund the Vac-
cine Act’s compensation program in 1987, the same committee 
that wrote the 1986 report stated that “[i]t is not the Commit-
tee’s intention to preclude court actions under applicable law,” 
and that the Act did not purport to “decide as a matter of law 
the circumstances in which a vaccine should be deemed un-
avoidably unsafe.”154 While this is technically subsequent legis-
lative history, it may still be entitled to some weight.155 
The legislative history reveals a plethora of statements 
that can be construed to support either argument.156 While it is 
apparent that there is no clear statement of legislative intent 
with respect to who decides whether a vaccine is beneficial 
enough to warrant its risks, Congress has made it clear 
through its behavior with respect to vaccination programs in 
the United States that it intended to assume the role as deci-
sionmaker.  
3. Congress Acts as Decisionmaker 
Reading the Act “against the backdrop of regulatory activi-
ty”157 elucidates Congress’s intent to decide vaccine policy. 
Congress has a lengthy history of enacting vaccine-specific leg-
islation to promote particular vaccines. Examples include the 
Poliomyelitis Vaccination Assistance Act of 1955,158 the Vacci-
nation Assistance Act of 1962,159 the National Swine Flu Im-
munization Program of 1976,160 and most recently, the Public 
 
 153. Id. (emphasis added). 
 154. H.R. REP. NO. 100-391(I), at 691 (1987), reprinted in 1987 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-364, 2313-365. 
 155. Shah, supra note 118, at 232. 
 156. See, e.g., 132 CONG. REC. H9943-02, at 29 (1986) (statement of Rep. 
Henry Waxman) (stating that an individual may bring a civil claim if an “in-
adequately researched” vaccine causes an injury). 
 157. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 519 (1992). 
 158. Pub. L. No. 84-377, 69 Stat. 704 (1955). 
 159. Pub. L. No. 87-868, 76 Stat. 1155 (1962). 
 160. Pub. L. No. 94-380, 90 Stat. 1113 (1976). 
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Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act.161 More-
over, when Congress chose to encourage certain pediatric vac-
cines, it knew not only that these vaccines were not entirely 
safe,162 but that some of them even had safer alternatives. For 
example, the federal government chose for its public immuniza-
tion program the Sabin Polio vaccine over the safer, but argua-
bly less effective, Salk vaccine.163 When the Vaccine Act was 
passed, Congress continued to promote the usefulness of the 
DTP vaccine containing whole-cell pertussis, despite the know-
ledge that an acellular design was already being used 
abroad.164 Even though some children would suffer adverse 
reactions from this vaccine, the federal government continued 
to support mandated vaccination for all school-aged children 
because it considered the benefits of the imperfect vaccine to 
outweigh the risks of going unvaccinated.165  
Notably, these decisions to promote less safe vaccine de-
signs are consistent with the Vaccine Act’s adoption of com-
ment k, which justifies the use of beneficial products that can-
not be made safe.166 A vaccine that cannot be made safe may be 
“unavoidably unsafe” even if it could be made safer, where use 
of the less safe product is best for public policy. Congress has 
already made such public policy decisions with respect to cer-
tain vaccines.167  
 
 161. 42 U.S.C. § 247d-6d (2005). The PREP Act provides tort immunity for 
manufacturers of vaccines deemed necessary to prevent a public health crisis. 
Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act Questions and Answers, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM. SERVICES, http://www.phe.gov/preparedness/ 
legal/prepact/pages/prepqa.aspx (last visited Sept. 29, 2010). Recently, this has 
been extended to include protection for manufacturers of the H1N1 Influenza 
vaccine. Pandemic Influenza Vaccines—Amendment, 74 Fed. Reg. 30,294 
(June 25, 2009). 
 162. No vaccine is entirely safe. CDC, supra note 42, at 1.  
 163. See Johnson v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318, 1320–22 (Kan. 
1986) (discussing the history of polio vaccines). 
 164. See CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra note 32, at 18 tbl.1 (recom-
mending the DTP vaccine for infants and children); id. at 38 (describing efforts 
to develop an acellular pertussis vaccine and the Japanese success with such a 
vaccine). The whole-cell vaccine is associated with adverse events such as local 
inflammatory reactions, vomiting, protracted crying, convulsions, and severe 
neurological disease. INST. OF MED., supra note 32, at 69–71. Unlike the “un-
desirably crude and reactive” whole-cell vaccine, the acellular vaccine contains 
only two protein antigens from the pertussis bacterium and causes fewer side 
effects. CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra note 32, at 38. 
 165. Willett, supra note 50, at 396. 
 166. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965). 
 167. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.  
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Congress has also directly and indirectly authorized vari-
ous agencies and groups to conduct investigations of each vac-
cine and its related injuries. For example, the ACIP168 eval-
uates each recommended vaccine, utilizing data from a 
multitude of sources, and uses this information to guide the 
other federal vaccine programs.169 ACIP’s guidance extends to 
the selection of appropriate vaccines, proper use of each vac-
cine, and creation of a list of vaccines to administer to children 
through the VFC program.170 ACIP’s deliberations “include 
consideration of population based studies such as efficacy, cost 
benefit, and risk benefit analyses.”171 NVAC172 also plays a role 
in vaccine development, research, and administration.173 NVAC 
advises the Assistant Secretary for Health with respect to vac-
cination safety and supply for both pediatric and adult popula-
tions, as well as with respect to specific vaccine issues.174 
The recent preemption cases in the realm of pharmaceuti-
cals and medical devices place a great deal of weight on the 
presumption against preemption.175 This presumption predom-
inantly applies “in areas of traditional state regulation,” where 
out of respect for state sovereignty, the Court presumes that 
“Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of ac-
tion.”176 Traditionally, issues of safety and health fall within 
the ambit of State regulation.177 The states, however, have a 
 
 168. See ACIP Charter, supra note 44 (setting forth the statutory authority 
for the ACIP). 
 169. See CDC, supra note 42, at 1. 
 170. See ACIP Charter, supra note 44. 
 171. Id. The ACIP’s “recommendations for vaccination practices balance 
scientific evidence of benefits for each person and to society against the poten-
tial costs and risks for vaccination for the individual and programs.” CDC, su-
pra note 42. 
 172. See National Vaccine Advisory Committee (NVAC), supra note 134. 
 173. Id. 
 174. For a list of many of NVAC’s reports and recommendations, see Re-
ports, Recommendations, and Resolutions, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH & HUM. 
SERVICES, http://www.hhs.gov/nvpo/nvac/reports/index.html (last visited Oct. 
17, 2010). 
 175. See, e.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194–95 (2009) (relying 
upon the presumption to find that there is no implied preemption for failure-
to-warn claims); Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (applying the 
presumption to find that design defect claims for medical devices that have not 
undergone pre-market approval are not preempted). 
 176. Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485. 
 177. See id. (noting “the historic primacy of state regulation of matters of 
health and safety”); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 
(1985) (citing Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 62 (1873) (explaining that 
the States traditionally “legislate as to the protection of the lives, limbs, 
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minimal role in vaccination policy compared to that of the fed-
eral government.178 Although the states have discretion in ad-
ministering vaccination programs and creating state-specific 
vaccination mandates,179 the federal government is the predom-
inant funding source for these programs180 and the states’ vac-
cination policies derive from the ACIP’s recommendations.181 In 
practice, therefore, the federal government makes all major 
vaccine-related policy decisions and the states merely choose 
how to implement those policies. 
The federal government recognizes that it has the obliga-
tion to provide the states with vaccines182 and that states are 
only an “adjunct in carrying out the Federal government’s re-
sponsibility to prevent the spread of infectious diseases.”183 
Through the various vaccine programs, such as the VFC and 
Section 317 Immunization Grant programs, the federal gov-
ernment has expended tremendous amounts of resources to 
supply vaccines to the states.184 The federal government is 
more than a mere financier of vaccination programs—it also 
mandates pediatric vaccination programs as a condition of re-
 
health, comfort, and quiet” of their residents)); see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 
U.S. 589, 603 n.30 (1977) (“[T]he State has broad police powers in regulating 
the administration of drugs by health professionals.”). 
 178. For a discussion of the expansive role of the federal government in 
vaccination policy, see supra notes 32–53 and accompanying text. 
 179. See, e.g., CDC, supra note 26, at 2 (discussing a report of “state laws, 
regulations, or rules that impose vaccination requirements” for children). The 
vaccine requirements are categorized by state. Id. 
 180. Most states depend primarily upon federal programs, such as the VFC 
and Section 317 Immunization Grant programs, to provide vaccines for their 
residents. INST. OF MED., CALLING THE SHOTS: IMMUNIZATION FINANCE 
POLICIES AND PRACTICES 8 (2000). 
 181. States’ immunization schedules are often derived directly from the 
ACIP’s recommendations. See, e.g., MINN. DEP’T OF HEALTH, HISTORY OF THE 
MINNESOTA SCHOOL IMMUNIZATION LAW (2004), available at http://www 
.health.state.mn.us/divs/idepc/immunize/laws/history.pdf (explaining that Min-
nesota’s immunization laws have been amended so as to be consistent with the 
ACIP’s recommendations); TEX. DEP’T OF STATE HEALTH SERVS., RECOM-
MENDED IMMUNIZATION SCHEDULE FOR PERSONS AGED 0 THROUGH 6 YEARS 
(2010), available at http://www.dshs.state.tx.us/immunize/docs/6-105.pdf (re-
printing CDC’s immunization schedule for Texas pediatric population).  
 182. 42 U.S.C. § 1396s(a)(2)(A) (2006). 
 183. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 5 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6344, 6346. 
 184. See INST. OF MED., supra note 180, at 8 (explaining that in fiscal year 
1999 alone, the federal government spent more than $600 million in vaccine 
supplies through the VFC and section 317 programs). For specific amounts 
awarded to each state between 1995 and 1999, see id. at 272–81. 
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ceiving other federal assistance.185 Furthermore, the U.S. vac-
cination program itself is commonly called a “national immuni-
zation system”186 with the NVPO187 at the helm. The sheer 
amount of federal legislation dealing with preventing the 
spread of infectious disease and encouraging immunization on-
ly further undermines the argument that vaccination is, or has 
ever been, an area of traditional state control.188 In fact, the 
Secretary of HHS has explicit statutory authority to take 
measures to prevent the transmission or spread of communica-
ble diseases between states.189  
The federal government has an overwhelming interest in 
national vaccination programs and the states play a secondary 
role when it comes to making vaccine policy decisions. Regula-
tion to promote immunization and combat the spread of com-
municable diseases is not only implicitly, but explicitly, within 
the scope of the federal government’s authority. This, therefore, 
is not one of those traditional areas of state regulation to which 
the presumption against preemption applies. 
The Vaccine Act, through its adoption of comment k, re-
quires a risk-benefit analysis for each federally recommended 
vaccine and its potential adverse effects before granting liabili-
ty immunity for vaccine manufacturers. Although the legisla-
tive history of the Vaccine Act is unclear as to who should con-
duct this inquiry, the Vaccine Act itself provides a large role for 
the federal government in making vaccine-related decisions, 
and the federal government has demonstrated throughout his-
tory an eagerness to assume this role. Congress has already 
made this determination with respect to most, if not all, cur-
 
 185. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(62) (2006) (requiring any state requesting 
medical assistance to implement an immunization program for all pediatric 
vaccines for all vaccine-eligible children); id. § 1396s(a)(2)(A) (requiring “each 
State [to] establish a pediatric vaccine distribution program”). The required 
pediatric vaccines are established by the ACIP. Id. § 1396s(e), (h)(6). 
 186. INST. OF MED., supra note 180, at 54 (describing changes and prob-
lems in the “national immunization system”) (emphasis added). 
 187. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 188. It has also been argued that the federal government has a “particular-
ly strong” interest in matters relating to other pharmaceutical products, and 
that the “mantra” that health and safety regulation is a local concern “is a 
holdover from the days before the federal government became a major finan-
cier of medical costs.” David R. Geiger & Mark D. Rosen, Rationalizing Prod-
uct Liability for Prescription Drugs: Implied Preemption, Federal Common 
Law, and Other Paths to Uniform Pharmaceutical Safety Standards, 45 
DEPAUL L. REV. 395, 411 (1996). 
 189. 42 U.S.C. § 264(a) (2006). 
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rent childhood vaccines on the market. It has successfully de-
veloped policies, procedures, agencies, and programs designed 
to conduct the necessary risk-benefit analyses, make vaccine-
related recommendations, and implement these recommenda-
tions throughout the country. Furthermore, conferring this 
power on Congress, rather than on state courts, does not offend 
current preemption jurisprudence because national immuniza-
tion policy is hardly a traditional state matter.  
III.  CHILDHOOD VACCINE LITIGATION IS PREEMPTED   
Congress is the appropriate decisionmaker with respect to 
vaccine policy and has already conducted the necessary risk-
benefit analyses for recommended childhood vaccines so as to 
qualify them as “unavoidably unsafe.” This Part demonstrates 
that Congress is better suited than courts and juries to make 
these types of decisions. Although preempting design defect 
claims against manufacturers raises some safety concerns, the 
consequences of adverse jury rulings outweigh these potential 
safety issues. Thus, any court that faces a design defect claim 
involving a recommended childhood vaccine should find the 
claim preempted. 
A. CONGRESS IS BEST SUITED TO MAKE VACCINE POLICY 
DECISIONS 
Congress is in a unique position and is particularly well 
suited for making decisions that would profoundly affect the 
nation’s vaccination programs. First, Congress has the benefit 
of pooling the resources of many different government and non-
government agencies, including the agencies within the HHS, 
(the CDC, NIH, FDA, and HRSA), other federal entities (the 
Department of Defense, USAID, NVPO’s Inter-Agency Vaccine 
Group (IAVG), and NVAC), as well as various global organiza-
tions, consumer groups, and academic institutions.190 Congress 
can take advantage of the FDA’s extensive involvement in pre-
market and post-market regulation of vaccines191 by using the 
information garnered through the FDA approval process in con-
junction with information obtained from other specialized pro-
grams devoted to researching vaccine benefits and safety. Ex-
isting safety monitoring programs include those established in 
 
 190. National Vaccine Program Office, supra note 34. 
 191. See supra notes 46–53 and accompanying text. 
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subpart C of the Vaccine Act,192 the Vaccine Adverse Event Re-
porting System,193 the Vaccine Safety Datalink Project,194 and 
other programs coordinated through the CDC’s Immunization 
Safety Office.195 The utilization of a variety of public and pri-
vate resources may compensate for any areas in which the 
FDA’s surveillance system may be lacking.196 Involvement of 
vaccine manufacturers in this process can help assure that 
those with the best access to information about these products 
are involved in the post-marketing research and surveil-
lance.197 
Juries, on the other hand, are poorly equipped to deal with 
such matters. A jury does not enjoy access to the same wealth 
of information that is available to Congress and may erroneous-
ly rely upon faulty scientific studies that lack adequate sup-
port.198 The information a jury can consider is constrained by 
 
 192. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-25 to -28 (1986). 
 193. Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS), CDC http://www 
.cdc.gov/vaccinesafety/Activities/VAERS.html (last modified Dec. 9, 2009). 
 194. Vaccine Safety Datalink (VSD) Project, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/ 
vaccinesafety/Activities/VSD.html (last modified Feb. 17, 2010). 
 195. About the Immunization Safety Office, CDC, http://www.cdc.gov/ 
vaccinesafety/Activities/About_ISO.html (last modified Mar. 23, 2010). 
 196. Some people have criticized the current post-marketing surveillance 
system for being too weak, unreliable, and underfunded. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-866, HIGHLIGHTS OF NEW DRUG APPROVAL: 
FDA NEEDS TO ENHANCE ITS OVERSIGHT OF DRUGS APPROVED ON THE BASIS 
OF SURROGATE ENDPOINTS (2009) (“Weaknesses in FDA’s monitoring and en-
forcement processes hamper its ability to effectively oversee postmarketing 
studies.”); Catherine D. DeAngelis & Phil B. Fontanarosa, Prescription Drugs, 
Products Liability, and Preemption of Tort Litigation, 300 JAMA 1939, 1940–
41 (2008) (describing flaws in the current postmarketing surveillance system 
and saying that “[t]he FDA is not infallible” and does not have a “crystal ball” 
with which it can foresee all possible risks); Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and 
the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance, Compensation, and the Role of 
Litigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 587, 600–06 (2005) (describ-
ing areas in which the FDA’s postmarketing surveillance are deficient). But 
see Losing Momentum, supra note 14, at 44 (statement of Wayne Pisano, Ex-
ecutive Vice President, Aventis Pasteur North America) (“The FDA/CDC regu-
latory regimen is comprehensive and well established.”); Geiger & Rosen, supra 
note 188, at 396 (arguing that the FDA’s extensive regulation is sufficient). 
 197. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1202 (2009) (“[M]anufacturers 
have superior access to information about their drugs, especially in the post-
marketing phase as new risks emerge.”); Adams v. G.D. Searle & Co., 576 So. 
2d 728, 733 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (“[A] drug manufacturer is in a better 
position to monitor the current state of knowledge and technology, as applied 
to its products, than is the FDA.”). 
 198. For example, the groundbreaking study that linked the measles, 
mumps, and rubella vaccine to autism has recently been retracted as dishon-
est and unethical. Gardiner Harris, Journal Retracts 1998 Paper Linking Au-
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the “inherent limitations of the trial process,” such as rules of 
evidence and the talents of a few attorneys.199 Furthermore, a 
jury is disproportionately exposed to the harmful effects a vac-
cine design had on a plaintiff, while the thousands of people 
who benefitted from the vaccine are underrepresented.200 Addi-
tionally, a jury may have difficulty finding in favor of “big busi-
ness” when an innocent, injured child would have to bear the 
loss.201 This is why Congress, and not juries, is responsible for 
conducting the cost-benefit analyses that affect both individual 
safety and national policy. 
Second, congressional decisionmaking is conducive to pro-
viding the uniformity and predictability that is needed to main-
tain the stability of the vaccine market. The driving forces be-
hind the Vaccine Act in 1986 were this sort of unpre-
dictability,202 and the necessity for a “consistent national policy 
in protecting our children against preventable diseases.”203 
When manufacturers are unable to predict their potential lia-
bility, they may become more hesitant to enter or remain in the 
market.204 If they do continue marketing their products, they 
will inevitably face higher insurance premiums and will recoup 
litigation and insurance expenses by raising vaccine prices, 
thus hindering access to vaccines.205 Jury determinations of a 
vaccine’s risks and benefits, on a case-by-case basis, offer the 
manufacturers no clarity on their liability in future cases.206 
 
tism to Vaccines, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2010, at A9, available at 2010 WLNR 
2234157. 
 199. Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 98 (Utah 1991). 
 200. Reigel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1008 (2008). 
 201. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 26 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6344, 6367. But see Struve, supra note 196, at 590 (stating that juries are not 
overly eager to award damages against business defendants). 
 202. H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 7. 
 203. Id. at 5. 
 204. See Kellen F. Cloney, Note, AIDS Vaccine Manufacturers v. Tort Re-
gime: The Need for Alternatives, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 559, 570 (explaining 
that “strict liability encourages timidity on the part of manufacturers because 
of the uncertainty of what may be found to be a defect”). 
 205. These types of litigation-driven price increases were a major factor in 
passing the Vaccine Act. See CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra note 32, at 
60–66 (discussing the drastic rise in vaccine prices leading up to the Vaccine 
Act); H.R. REP. NO. 99-908, at 6 (explaining that manufacturers were having 
difficulty procuring affordable product liability insurance as a result of the in-
creasing numbers of lawsuits). 
 206. See Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 98 (Utah 1991) (finding 
that a trial court is not the proper forum in which to conduct a risk-benefit 
analysis of a drug). 
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Such unpredictable assessments of a vaccine’s risks and bene-
fits threaten the supply of vaccines and continued vitality of 
the national vaccine program.  
Additionally, a system in which each state has a different 
requirement for vaccine design would reduce the likelihood that 
such products would ever be developed. Vaccine research and 
development is complex and time-consuming, and manufactur-
ers may simply be unable to “tailor their complex products and 
product descriptions to fifty-plus different jurisdictions.”207 Im-
agine the difficulties vaccine manufacturers would face if they 
were required to use a different preservative for their vaccines 
in each state or if some states required some components that 
were banned in other states. While today the issue might be the 
use of thimerosal as a preservative, it is easily foreseeable that 
in the near future other preservatives or vaccine components 
could be attacked, too.208 Vaccine manufacturers cannot be ex-
pected to overhaul their product design with every new jury 
verdict. Even if manufacturers could and were willing to design 
different vaccines for each state, the increased delays and costs 
of vaccine production and marketing would harm the public.209  
B. ARE WE SACRIFICING SAFETY FOR SUPPLY? 
The strongest argument for preserving tort litigation for 
vaccine designs is that such litigation is necessary to maintain 
and improve the safety of vaccines. It is possible that granting 
“blanket immunity from tort liability would remove an incen-
tive for developing safer designs.”210 Furthermore, tort law may 
help serve as a useful adjunct to FDA surveillance, filling in 
 
 207. Geiger & Rosen, supra note 188, at 396. 
 208. For example, the preservative phenol “is corrosive and causes chemical 
burns” and can cause “systemic poisoning.” Agency for Toxic Substances & Dis-
ease Registry, U.S. DEPARTMENT HEALTH HUM. SERVICES, http://www.atsdr 
.cdc.gov/mhmi/mmg115.html (last updated Aug. 14, 2010). Another agent used 
in vaccines, 2-phenoxyethanol, also may cause serious injuries. Daniel Dunkin, 
2-Phenoxyethanol: A Toxic Vaccine Antibacterial, ASSOCIATED CONTENT (July 
23, 2008), http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/887293/2phenoxyethanol_ 
a_toxic_vaccine_antibacterial.html?cat=5. 
 209. See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 479 (Cal. 1988) (explain-
ing that withholding a drug from the public until all dangerous side effects are 
known “would not serve the public welfare,” and that “public policy favors the 
development and marketing of beneficial new drugs” even when there are se-
rious risks involved). 
 210. Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari, 668 S.E.2d 236, 242 (Ga. 2008). 
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gaps in FDA regulation211 and assisting the FDA in its task of 
monitoring vaccine safety.212 
Although litigation might incentivize continued research 
and testing,213 these safety incentives already exist.214 The FDA 
can revoke licenses if it discovers that a product is unsafe215 
and the Vaccine Act itself mandates continued research and re-
porting.216 There is no need to impose litigation on top of al-
ready demanding requirements and effective incentives. This is 
best demonstrated by the fact that even in the absence of de-
sign defect claims in the years since the Vaccine Act was 
enacted, vaccines remain safer than ever.217  
Meanwhile, the costs of preserving this avenue of litigation 
are enormous. A single jury verdict finding a particular vaccine 
to be defective in design could deprive all residents of that state 
the ability to obtain that vaccination, at least during the time it 
would take to develop and obtain FDA approval of an alternate 
design.218 Any business-savvy manufacturer would immediate-
ly remove its product from that jurisdiction in order to avoid 
continued liability exposure.219 Replacement of a “defective” 
vaccine can take years, since the altered product would have to 
undergo a complete round of testing and licensure.220 Depriva-
tion of one state’s residents of a vaccine has broader implica-
tions than just the public health of that state. Communicable 
diseases spread across state lines easily, and an unvaccinated 
population in one state can easily affect the health and lives of 
residents of every other state.221 It is the federal government’s 
 
 211. See DeAngelis & Fontanarosa, supra note 196, at 1939. 
 212. See Struve, supra note 196, at 591. 
 213. Okianer Christian Dark, Is the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 
1986 the Solution for the DTP Controversy?, 19 U. TOL. L. REV. 799, 838 (1988). 
 214. See Paul A. Offit, Lawsuits Won’t Stop Pandemics, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 
2005, at A16 (arguing that tort litigation plays no role in pushing vaccine 
manufacturers to produce better, safer vaccines). 
 215. 42 U.S.C. § 262(a)(2)(A) (2006). 
 216. Id. § 300aa-25 (2006). 
 217. Immunization Vaccine Safety, CDC (Jan. 21, 2009), http://www.cdc 
.gov/vaccines/pubs/downloads/f_vacsafe.pdf (“The United States currently has 
the safest, most effective vaccine supply in history.”).  
 218. Willett, supra note 50, at 397. 
 219. See id.  
 220. Losing Momentum, supra note 14, at 40 (statement of Wayne Pisano, 
Executive Vice President, Aventis Pasteur North America) (explaining that 
“[a]ny change to a vaccine is a complex endeavor” and that it takes about two 
years to replace an existing product). 
 221. For example, in 1994, one out-of-state tourist at a ski resort caused an 
outbreak of measles affecting 247 people in nine different states. CDC, Inter-
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role to prevent the spread of communicable diseases,222 and it is 
not sound public policy to allow one jury to risk the lives of all 
Americans. 
C. DESIGN DEFECT LITIGATION SHOULD NOT BE PERMITTED 
The real policy question underlying this debate is simply 
whether it is worth risking the loss of all vaccines from the 
market for at least a few years, or possibly forever, in order to 
preserve the slim effect design defect litigation has on incenti-
vizing safety improvements. The answer is a resounding no. 
There are already numerous incentives to encourage continued 
research and reporting of vaccine safety. The potential incre-
mental increased incentive that litigation might provide is not 
worth the enormous public health consequences it entails.  
Protecting vaccine manufacturers does not mean those in-
jured by vaccines will have no recourse. They continue to have 
access to the Vaccine Court and they may continue to assert 
tort claims other than design defect where appropriate. If the 
Vaccine Act’s compensation system is not functioning adequate-
ly,223 then Congress can make the necessary changes that will 
improve that system so as to provide faster or easier compensa-
tion to victims of vaccines.224 Meanwhile, it is better to err on 
the side of protecting the nation from a resurgence of commu-
nicable diseases, than it is to err on the side of preserving a 
particular tort claim for a select group of individuals at the ex-
pense of the national vaccine supply.  
Through examining the numerous federal legislative acts 
governing vaccine policy, as well as the broad scheme of federal 
control over the national immunization program, it becomes 
apparent that Congress has already taken charge of the policy 
decisions involving childhood vaccine research and administra-
 
state Measles Transmission from a Ski Resort—Colorado, 1994, 43 MORBIDITY 
& MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 627, 627 (1994). 
 222. 42 U.S.C. § 264(a) (2006). 
 223. It is debatable whether the compensation system is satisfactory. Com-
pare The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Is It Working as 
Congress Intended? Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 107th 
Cong. 6–13, 140–45 (2001) (statement of Rep. Dan Burton) (claiming that the 
program is working as Congress intended), with The Continuing Oversight of 
the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 107th Cong. 95–98 (2002) (statement of Ron Homer, 
Attorney) (critiquing the program as too adversarial). 
 224. Congress has evaluated the Vaccine Program on several occasions, 
making various changes. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 106-977 (2000) (recommend-
ing improvements to the Vaccine Program). 
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tion. Therefore, while the Vaccine Act does not preempt all vac-
cine design defect litigation, it does preempt design defect liti-
gation for the federally encouraged routine childhood vaccines. 
These vaccines have already undergone the required case-by-
case analysis and any court facing a claim involving one of 
these vaccines should find the claim preempted. 
  CONCLUSION   
Vaccines are one of the most important medical advance-
ments in history. The federal government has greatly contri-
buted to the success of the nation’s immunization efforts 
through vaccine-related legislation and the creation of federal 
agencies tasked with evaluating the safety and effectiveness of 
routine childhood vaccines. This success, however, has recently 
been threatened by litigation concerning the preemptive scope 
of the Vaccine Act. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth presents the question of 
whether the Act preempts all design defect claims or instead 
requires a case-by-case analysis of each vaccine. The parties, 
unfortunately, completely ignore the question of whether the 
required case-by-case analysis has already been performed with 
respect to routine childhood vaccines. 
The Act’s use of the word “unavoidable” suggests that some 
case-by-case analysis is required before design defect litigation 
can be precluded, but the appropriate body for conducting this 
analysis is Congress and the institutions and agencies through 
which it works. Congress has always taken the lead in regulat-
ing national vaccine policy and must continue to do so to ensure 
the stability that is required to maintain the supply of vaccines 
in the market. Not all vaccine-related design defect claims are 
preempted by the Vaccine Act, but such claims related to rou-
tine, federally encouraged childhood vaccines are preempted. 
Congress has already determined that the benefits of these 
vaccines outweigh their risk, thus rendering them “unavoidably 
unsafe.”  
Allowing such design defect claims could cripple the na-
tion’s immunization programs. This is an unacceptable risk 
considering that those individuals harmed by such vaccines al-
ready have an adequate means of recompense. Any court facing 
this question should find that these design defect claims are 
preempted. If Congress changes its position and decides that 
public policy does not favor the surrender of such claims, it can 
easily address this with new legislation, perhaps more clearly 
drafted. 
